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ABSTRACT
Computational Psychiatry aims to describe the
relationship between the brain’s neurobiology, its
environment and mental symptoms in computational
terms. In so doing, it may improve psychiatric
classiﬁcation and the diagnosis and treatment of mental
illness. It can unite many levels of description in a
mechanistic and rigorous fashion, while avoiding
biological reductionism and artiﬁcial categorisation. We
describe how computational models of cognition can
infer the current state of the environment and weigh up
future actions, and how these models provide new
perspectives on two example disorders, depression and
schizophrenia. Reinforcement learning describes how the
brain can choose and value courses of actions according
to their long-term future value. Some depressive
symptoms may result from aberrant valuations, which
could arise from prior beliefs about the loss of agency
(‘helplessness’), or from an inability to inhibit the mental
exploration of aversive events. Predictive coding explains
how the brain might perform Bayesian inference about
the state of its environment by combining sensory data
with prior beliefs, each weighted according to their
certainty (or precision). Several cortical abnormalities in
schizophrenia might reduce precision at higher levels of
the inferential hierarchy, biasing inference towards
sensory data and away from prior beliefs. We discuss
whether striatal hyperdopaminergia might have an
adaptive function in this context, and also how
reinforcement learning and incentive salience models
may shed light on the disorder. Finally, we review some
of Computational Psychiatry’s applications to
neurological disorders, such as Parkinson’s disease, and
some pitfalls to avoid when applying its methods.
INTRODUCTION
Computational Psychiatry aims ﬁrst to model the
computations that the brain performs—that is, the
brain’s solutions to the problems it faces—and
second to thereby understand how the ‘abnormal’
perceptions, thoughts and behaviours that are cur-
rently used to deﬁne psychiatric disorders relate to
normal function and neural processes. By formalis-
ing mathematically the relationship between symp-
toms, environments and neurobiology, it hopes to
provide tools to identify the causes of particular
symptoms in individual patients.
Computational Psychiatry is at least partially
motivated by the shortcomings of the current psy-
chiatric classiﬁcation systems (the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or
DSM-5,1 and the International Classiﬁcation of
Diseases, or ICD-102), in which the symptoms
entail the diagnosis and which lack mechanistic
explanations for mental symptoms. The reliability
of diagnostic systems was ‘bought at the price of
validity’3—meaning clinicians have some conﬁ-
dence that given a set of symptoms they would all
make a consistent diagnosis, but no conﬁdence that
that diagnosis corresponds to a single biological or
psychological entity, or that it can predict the
outcome of either the illness or a given treatment.
Likewise, the biopsychosocial model of mental
illness4 has had great success in helping clinicians
understand illness at a human level, but as a causal
account it fails: its constituent parts (particularly
the biological and psychosocial) are separated by a
wide explanatory gap.
The National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH) generated the Research Domain Criteria
(RDoC5) in an attempt to revive psychiatric classiﬁ-
cation with a bracing dose of mechanistic validity.
The RDoC consists of ﬁve ‘domains’ of mental
functions that are each described at multiple levels
or ‘units of analysis’: the hope is that these units
will yield biomarkers to distinguish normal and
abnormal functioning. In principle, this approach
has several advantages, but we note that the current
RDoC (it is a working document) views psychiatric
disorder—including its social risk factors—through
a very biological lens. Indeed, its units of analysis
step from ‘genes’ to ‘molecules’ to ‘cells’ to ‘cir-
cuits’ to ‘physiology’, and then leap straight to
‘behaviour’. Computational Psychiatry provides
some of the tools to link these levels.
Numerous authoritative reviews of initial develop-
ments in Computational Psychiatry already exist,6–15
alongside pioneering work by Hoffman,16 Cohen17
and many others. In this article, we look towards the
future and—using examples from depression and
schizophrenia—illustrate Computational Psychiatry’s
potential for reconceptualising psychiatric disorders
and generating new hypotheses. Prior to this, we
brieﬂy rehearse the advantages in adopting a
Computational Psychiatry approach.
Computational Psychiatry unites many levels of
description
Computational Psychiatry’s organising principles
arose in computational neuroscience, when Marr18
identiﬁed three levels at which the problems solved
by the brain may be described. At a ‘computational’
level, the formal nature of the problem has to be
described: What are the mathematical and statistical
issues involved? What solutions do these issues
allow? The ‘algorithmic’ level describes the method
of solving the problem. This may be an
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approximation or a much more complex procedure. The ‘imple-
mentational’ level describes the physical realisation of this method:
How does coordinated activity in neurons or brain circuits encode
these algorithms?
Critically, these three levels are not entirely independent.
Although any algorithm could be implemented physiologically
in many ways, constraints at one level have implications at other
levels: Some computations (eg, high-dimensional integrals) may
be very laborious for neural systems, so algorithmic approxima-
tions become necessary. System failures caused by complex com-
putational problems can therefore provide important clues
about underlying algorithms.
In the biological sphere, this simple trinity is crossed with
other relevant levels of description. For example, the implemen-
tational level itself can be decomposed into RDoC’s various
‘units of analysis’, from genes to physiology as well as (we
would argue) social interaction.8 19 With respect to most mental
disorders, Computational Psychiatry lies at the nexus of these
descriptive levels and makes them explicit.
Computational Psychiatry is mechanistic and rigorous
Computational Psychiatry is mechanistic in a way that the
DSM-5, ICD-10 and biopsychosocial model can never be,
thanks to its use of generative models. A generative model is a
probabilistic description of how high-level causes actually gener-
ate low-level data (in contrast, a discriminative model merely
describes how to label such data with their likely causesi). This
distinction is important because knowing how causes generate
data allows a model to generate synthetic or ‘simulated’ data
from given causes.
This generative description can be of how brain activity gen-
erates brain imaging data, or of how states in the world evolve
and affect an agent’s decision-making (eg, ﬁgure 1, described in
the next section); in the latter case, commonly used in
Computational Psychiatry, we are modelling the brain’s own
model of the world.20 By altering key parameters in our genera-
tive models of agents’ brains, we can observe what effects they
have on decision-making and use this information to optimise
experimental design or make counter-intuitive predictions.
Bayesian statistics and machine learning techniques then allow
this entire description to be tested against real data for
goodness-of-ﬁt. Comparisons of generative models by means of
Bayesian model selection offer among the most rigorous and
global comparative assessment of scientiﬁc hypotheses.21
Formulating a generative model requires an explicit descrip-
tion of the mathematical details of the cognitive or neural
process from the outset. This is difﬁcult but important, as it can
force one not only to think hard about what particular con-
structs (such as ‘attention’ or ‘salience’) really mean,22 but also
to be very explicit about assumptions and ignorance.
Computational Psychiatry is not biologically reductionist
Computational Psychiatry is of course reductionist in the sense
that it wishes to reduce cognitive processes to computations.
Importantly, however, it does not view genes, neurotransmitters
or neural circuits as causes of mental illness separate to the
context in which the agent operates.23 Indeed, it is precisely
the agent’s environment (both physical and social) which the
nervous system may be trying to model, and which our models
must also reﬂect.8 19
It is true that the new science of epigenetics (heralded by
Engel4 almost 40 years ago) also places genes ﬁrmly in their
environmental context; but as an explanation of mental illness,
a gene–environment interaction in the absence of any computa-
tional speciﬁcation is a sandwich without the meat. What
Psychiatry ultimately wants to know is: How and why does this
gene–environment interaction change inference (and thereby
experience and behaviour)?
Computational Psychiatry is not artiﬁcially categorical
One important, but unfulﬁlled, aspiration of the architects of
DSM-5 was to move beyond purely categorical diagnoses to a
more dimensional system, as it seems our current categories are
not valid at the clinical24 or genetic25 levels. Such an approach
would not classify a person with psychosis as just one of ‘schizo-
phrenic’, ‘bipolar’ or ‘schizoaffective’, but might instead score
them on scales of ‘manic’ and ‘depressive’ mood symptoms,
‘positive’ (delusional and hallucinatory) and ‘negative’ (avoli-
tional) psychotic symptoms, and ‘cognitive impairment’.
Computational Psychiatry can accommodate and inform both
categorical and dimensional approaches—each driven by data.
For example, one might ﬁnd that depressed participants and con-
trols differ continuously (dimensionally) on a certain parameter
derived from a certain computational model (eg, ‘reward predic-
tion error signalling’).26 Alternatively, one might ﬁnd evidence
that different models are used by distinct groups (ie, possible cat-
egories) to perform the same task, for example, patients with
schizophrenia with high or low negative symptoms,27 or those
with remitted psychosis and controls.28 More generally, having
deﬁned alternative (eg, categorical vs dimensional) models,
Computational Psychiatry allows one to assess the evidence for
competing theories formally, for instance using Bayesian model
comparison. Identifying computational categories and dimen-
sions in this way ought to improve both psychiatric nosology29
and the targeting and monitoring of treatments.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Computational theories of mind often mirror contemporaneous
engineering practices, and vice versa. In the 1970s, for example,
philosophers of mind took inspiration from the computer’s
manipulation of symbols according to deterministic syntactic rules,
and sought to explain how humans might also think logically.30
Recently, computer science has tried to make machines that
can learn and make probabilistic inferences using uncertain or
incomplete data, as biological agents can. In this section, we
brieﬂy introduce some necessary theoretical constructs in probabil-
istic inference and action selection before discussing some
Computational Psychiatry approaches to depression and psychosis.
Inferring the present
Put as simply as possible, the brain’s fundamental computational
task is to infer the state of its environment and choose actions
on that basis. Unfortunately, neither its sensory data nor its
prior knowledge is completely reliable, and so the brain must
use both sources of information—taking into account their
uncertainty—to perform its task. The optimal combination of
uncertain information is given by Bayes’ theorem, in which a
‘prior’ (the initial expectation of the state of the environment) is
combined with a ‘likelihood’ (the probability of the sensory
input, given that expectation) to compute a ‘posterior’
(an updated estimation of the state of the environment).
For simplicity, these probability distributions are often assumed
iIn mathematical terms, discriminative models learn p(causes|data)—the
probability of some causes, given the data—whereas generative models
learn the reverse, p(data|causes), and use that (and p(causes) and Bayes’
theorem) to compute p(causes|data).
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to be of a kind that can be represented by a few ‘sufﬁcient statis-
tics’; for instance, the mean and precision (inverse variance) of a
Normal distribution, in this case both prior and likelihood, can
be conveniently weighted by their (scalar) precision.
Aside from their inherent uncertainty, the statistics of natural
sensory stimulation are also extremely complex. Nevertheless, as
a consequence of the hierarchical structure of the environment,
they contain patterns: These patterns are easiest to interpret if
the brain’s prior beliefs respect the hierarchical structure in its
sensory data—that is, if they take the form of a hierarchical
model. Hierarchical models explain complex patterns of low-
level data features in terms of more abstract causes: for
example, the shape that describes a collection of pixels, or the
climate that describes annual variation in weather. Hierarchical
models are particularly important in the face of complex situa-
tions, both behavioural and sensory, and allow for highly efﬁ-
cient decompositions that greatly support planning and simplify
optimal decision-making.31–33
Hierarchical generative models can use predictive coding (or
other methods) to predict low-level data by exploiting their
high-level descriptions, for example, reconstructing the missing
part of an image.34 35 In predictive coding, a unit at a given
hierarchical level sends messages to one or more units at lower
levels which predict their activity; discrepancies between these
predictions and the actual input are then passed back up the
hierarchy in the form of prediction errors. These prediction
errors revise the higher level predictions, and this hierarchical
message passing continues in an iterative fashion.
Exactly which predictions ought to be changed in order to
explain away a given prediction error is a crucial question for
hierarchical models. An approximately Bayesian solution to this
problem is to make the biggest updates to the level whose uncer-
tainty is greatest relative to the incoming data at the level below:
that is, if you are very uncertain about your beliefs, but your
source is very reliable, you ought to change your beliefs a lot.
Say, for example, I am walking at dusk, and I perceive the
movement of a bush in my peripheral vision. I might explain
this at various hierarchical levels, as (1) the bush did not actually
move; it was a trick of the light; (2) the wind was moving the
bush; (3) an animal was moving the bush and (4) a man hiding
in the bush, intending to rob me, moved it. The conclusion that
I draw will be determined by how precise my beliefs (at each
level) are that (1) I saw movement; (2) the wind probably did
not cause it; (3) there are probably no animals in the vicinity
and (4) there is probably no mugger in the vicinity. The most
uncertain (least precise) of these beliefs will have to change
(assuming, for the sake of argument, that their likelihoods are
equivalent), with very distinct consequences for my subsequent
behaviour. Put more formally, the uncertainty (inverse precision)
at each level helps determine the learning rate at that level, that
is, the size of the adjustments that are made to explain new
data.34
Figure 1 A hierarchical generative model, illustrated using the ‘beads’ or ‘urn’ task. On the left, two jars are hidden behind a screen, one
containing mostly green and some red balls, the other the converse. A sequence of balls is being drawn from one of these jars, in view of an
observer, who is asked to guess from which jar they are coming. We have illustrated a simple hierarchical generative model of this process on the
right: the observer is using such a model to make his/her guess. Variables in shaded circles are observed, and variables in unshaded circles are
‘hidden’ (ie, part of the model only). At the bottom of the model is x1, the colour of the currently observed bead. Uncertainty about this quantity
(eg, if the light is low or if the participant is colour-blind) is denoted as ω1. At the next level of the model is x2, the belief about the identity of the
current jar, and its associated uncertainty ω2, known as state uncertainty or ambiguity. Another form of uncertainty, risk or outcome uncertainty
(ω0) governs the relationship between the identity of the jar and the next outcome: Even if we are sure of the jar’s identity, we cannot be certain of
the colour of the next bead. At the top of the model is the belief about the probability that the jars could be swapped at any time, known as
volatility. We have not shown them here but this could have its own associated uncertainty, and there could be further levels above this. Last, the
participant must use his/her belief about the identity of the jar to make a guess: The mapping between this belief and the response y is affected by
a degree of stochasticity or decision ‘noise’, τ. In schizophrenia, there may be too much uncertainty (ie, lower precision) in higher hierarchical areas
that encode states or make decisions, and an underestimation of uncertainty in lower (sensory) areas.
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A classic psychology experiment illustrates uncertainty at dif-
ferent levels (see ﬁgure 1). Imagine you are shown two jars of
beads, one containing 85% green and 15% red beads, the other
85% red and 15% green. The jars are then hidden and a
sequence of beads is drawn (with replacement)—GGRGG. You
are asked to guess the colour of the next bead. Even if you are
quite certain of the identity of the jar (say, green), you will still
be only 85% certain that the next bead will be green. This is
‘outcome uncertainty’ or risk. Imagine you see more beads—the
total sequence is GGRGGRR. Now you are very uncertain
about the identity of the jar. This is ‘state uncertainty’ or ambi-
guity. Imagine you see a much longer sequence—
GGRGGRRRRRGGGRGGGGGGRGGGG. From this, it seems
that the jar changes from green (5 draws), to red (5 draws), to
green (remaining sequence). Such temporal changes in hidden
causes give rise to ‘volatility’;36 37 for example, someone surrep-
titiously switching the jar during the experiment.
Now suppose that although the real proportions are 85% and
15%, a malicious experimenter misleadingly told you that they
are 99.9% and 0.1%. From the 25 draw sequence above, you
might reasonably conclude that the jars had actually changed
eight times—whenever the colour changed. This is what
happens when the precision at the bottom of a hierarchical
model is too high relative to the precision at the top: Following
a sensory prediction error, the model concludes that there must
have been a change in the environment (in this simplistic
example, the jar), rather than ‘putting it down to chance’.
This precision imbalance might contribute to the well-known
‘jumping to conclusions’ reasoning bias in schizophrenia38
(although another cause might be noisy decision-making28) and
the formation of delusional beliefs themselves, which commonly
arise in an atmosphere of vivid sensory experiences and strange
coincidences.14 We return to the subject of delusions in the
Psychosis section.
Weighing the future
On top of the inference about current stimuli and states, the
brain needs to solve a second, orthogonal and complicating
problem, which arises from the fact that behaviours have both
immediate and future consequences. A brief moment of pleasure
can have nasty consequences and, though tempting, might best
be avoided. Conversely, pain now might result in even greater
pleasures later. Optimal behaviour needs to weigh the future
against the present. Even in the rare circumstances where infer-
ence about the present is perfectly realisable, the brain therefore
faces a second set of uncertainties. As the future is not known,
the values of possible actions (their summed future rewards and
punishments) have to be somehow estimated.
The ﬁeld of reinforcement learning (RL) has delineated two
fundamentally different ways in which past experience is used
to estimate and predict future rewards and punishments:
so-called model-based (MB) and model-free (MF) cognition.
In MB or goal-directed cognition, experience is compiled into
a (possibly hierarchical) generative model of the world—a
mechanistic, causal understanding of the causes and conse-
quences of actions and events. When faced with a particular
situation, this model can be searched, and the quality of various
behaviours deduced—even if they have never been tried or
experienced. As this involves somehow simulating or inferring
future possibilities, it can have high computational costs.
In MF or habitual cognition, conversely, the agent does not
store information about state transitions (ie, exactly what is
likely to happen next if a particular action is performed);
instead, the agent merely records how much reinforcement is
obtained when a certain state st is visited at time t or an action
at is taken. The agent then computes the discrepancy between
the expected outcome Vt(st) and the actually obtained outcome
rt—the prediction error δt=rt+Vt(st+1)−V(st). MF learning adds
a fraction ε of the reward prediction errors δt to the expecta-
tions every time the state st is visited: Vt+1(st)=Vt(st)+εδt and
thereby reduces the discrepancy between expected and received
reinforcements. Under some conditions, this will reveal the true,
consistent set of values that incorporate ‘future’ outcomes to the
extent that these have followed past choices.
MF learning is computationally undemanding but slow and
inﬂexible, so it is undermined by sudden changes to the environ-
ment or to the valuation of rewards. One example of this is a
rat learning how to obtain salty food in a maze: MB learning
would create knowledge of the internal structure of the maze
and the kind of rewards available within it, whereas MF learn-
ing would register a given sequence of left/right turns as being
the best thing to do. If the rat’s usual route were blocked, or if
it were thirsty, then the MF information would not be useful.
The MF account can be extended—for example, using hierarch-
ical models—to allow more sensitivity to changes.39
We next describe these issues in the context of depression and
schizophrenia, with the discussion of depression focusing more
on valuation, that is, weighing the future, and that of schizo-
phrenia on inference in the present.
VALUATION IN DEPRESSION
Depression is by its nature an aversive state, usually accompan-
ied by negative thoughts about the self, the world and the
future, and sometimes characterised by reduced interest and/or
pleasure known as anhedonia. However, the core symptoms of
depression—sadness, a lack of energy and a reduced ability to
enjoy things—are also a frequent but temporary feature of
everyday affective experience. The symptoms can become a con-
dition of potentially life-threatening severity if they become part
of a vicious circle of negative affect, cognition and behaviour
that is impervious to positive inﬂuences.
Computational descriptions of normative and resource-
rational choices—RL and Bayesian decision theory—reveal
many ways in which such a vicious circle could arise. We review
how a stable state of anhedonia might exist in RL, and then
close with a few speculative suggestions about the most likely
paths to this state. Parts of this are described in more detail
elsewhere.40 41
Primary utility
With respect to the potential causes of depression, the most
obvious candidate in RL is the so-called utility or reward func-
tion r. This function uses one scalar number to describe how
rewarding (increasingly positive) or punishing (increasingly
negative) events in the world are. Some kinds of events may
have genetically encoded reward or punishment utilities—most
likely, only those of direct relevance to the individual’s genetic
ﬁtness. Other events acquire ‘utility’ through experience and
inference. A very broad undervaluation as in anhedonia could
arise from reductions in hard-wired primary utility functions.
However, evidence for this is both scant and complex. The
apparent utilities of two likely primary events—pleasure derived
from sweet tastes and pain—are not reliably blunted in depres-
sion when measured in the laboratory.42 43 This contrasts with
richer and more complex stimuli such as pictures of facial
expressions, movies and music, where blunted affective ratings
and physiological responses are reliably present in the appetitive
and aversive domains.44 Since the affective value of these more
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complex stimuli has to be constructed and inferred, unlike that
of events with primary utility, this points to the impaired infer-
ence about value as the central driver of undervaluation in
depression.
Inferred value in depression
RL is concerned with the problem of assigning and inferring
value. Speciﬁcally, it provides a set of techniques to infer the
long-term primary utility, either when occupying any one par-
ticular state or when faced with a particular stimulus devoid of
any intrinsic primary utility itself, such as a picture. Either of
the two classes of approaches to valuation, MB and MF, could
in principle underlie aberrant valuation of complex stimuli.
We ﬁrst brieﬂy examine MF valuation, which, as introduced
brieﬂy above, depends on reward prediction errors. Three types
of experimental set-up in humans speak to this. First are experi-
ments examining prediction errors per se without any require-
ment for learning (ie, the contingencies are fully instructed),
such as the monetary incentive delay task.45 In general, such
tasks have not yielded consistent differences between depressed
and control subjects in either behavioural measures or their
neural correlates in the areas most strongly associated with MF
learning, such as the ventral striatum.46–50 Second are studies
explicitly examining the kind of trial-by-trial learning described
by MF valuation. While these studies have shown slightly more
consistent group differences at the neural level, for instance in
the ventral striatum, their interpretation is complicated both by
variable results in the midbrain dopaminergic regions and often
by the absence of any behavioural effects.26 51–54 Third are
studies using a probabilistic response bias task.55 RL modelling
of this task suggested that anhedonia was not related to MF
learning.56
In contrast, several features of MB valuation appear to be
involved in depression. Cognitive theories of depression have
long emphasised the importance of schemas,57 58 which, when
activated by environmental triggers, lead to negative automatic
thoughts and consequent aversive feelings. From a Bayesian per-
spective, these schemas can be viewed as priors, and the auto-
matic thoughts as the result of a combination of the priors with
the triggering sensory events. One example of this is learned
helplessness, a model of depression in which healthy animals
are exposed to uncontrollable stressors and come to show a
variety of depression-like behavioural anomalies in other situa-
tions.59 These effects can arise from prior beliefs about the
achievability of desirable outcomes.60 One would expect that,
being part of the model of the world, the prior would act
within the goal-directed MB valuation system. Indeed, the
behavioural effects of uncontrollable stressors depend on
midline prefrontal areas61 known to be involved in MB
reasoning.62
One feature that is of particular interest is emotion regulation.
We suggest that it again arises chieﬂy in MB evaluation and
might be understood in terms of meta-reasoning. Since most
valuation problems are computationally demanding, the MB
evaluator faces the meta-reasoning problem of how to allocate
its resources efﬁciently—that is, how to choose which evaluative
(internal) actions maximise the chances of choosing the best
(external) action. For example, one could sacriﬁce an exhaustive
search of all possible outcomes to save time by only evaluating a
small number of more likely scenarios. This problem has many
of the features of the original valuation problem, but differs in
that in theory it only incurs computational costs and not those
of the real world (eg, pain). In practice, however, this distinction
does not seem to hold for humans. Since imagination of aversive
events has emotionally aversive consequences, internal simula-
tions themselves also incur some of the same costs as real-world
experience. Indeed, it has been found that MB valuation is
exquisitely sensitive to simulated events. Healthy subjects
robustly avoid plans that involve losses.63 It appears that patients
with depression have a deﬁcit in this inhibition of aversive pro-
cessing,64 65 with aversive stimuli hijacking rather than inhibit-
ing processing:66 This is a potential cause of the repetitive
negative thoughts typical of rumination67—a key component of
the depressive vicious circle.
PRECISION AND D2 RECEPTORS IN PSYCHOSIS
Having discussed aspects of valuation in depression, we now
turn to a discussion of inference in schizophrenia. Speciﬁcally,
we explore how various neurobiological abnormalities in schizo-
phrenia might be characterised in computational terms, and
how these characterisations might aid our understanding of the
disorder. We discuss reductions in synaptic gain in higher hier-
archical areas, and increased presynaptic dopaminergic availabil-
ity and its consequences for tonic and phasic dopaminergic
signalling in the striatum.
Psychosis, synaptic gain and precision
What are the main cortical abnormalities in schizophrenia and
what do they have in common (reviewed in detail elsewhere68)?
One key abnormality is thought to be hypofunction of the
N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor (NMDA-R)—a glutamate recep-
tor with profound effects on synaptic gain (due to its prolonged
opening time) and synaptic plasticity (via long-term potentiation
or depression)—in both the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and hippo-
campus (HC). A second is the reduced synthesis of
γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA) by inhibitory interneurons in PFC.
A third is the hypoactivation of D1 receptors in PFC (we shall
discuss striatal hyperactivation of D2 receptors in the next
section).
These abnormalities could all reduce synaptic gain in PFC or
HC, that is, around the top of the cortical hierarchy. Synaptic
gain (or ‘short term’ synaptic plasticity69) refers to a multiplica-
tive change in the inﬂuence of presynaptic input on postsynaptic
responses. NMDA-R hypofunction and D1 receptor hypoactivity
are most easily related to a change in synaptic gain. Similarly, a
GABAergic deﬁcit might cause a loss of ‘synchronous’ gain.
Sustained oscillations in neuronal populations are facilitated
through their rhythmic inhibition by GABAergic interneurons,
putatively increasing communication between neurons that oscil-
late in phase with each other.70
How can synaptic gain (and its loss) be understood in compu-
tational terms? One answer rests on the idea that the brain
approximates and simpliﬁes Bayesian inference by using prob-
ability distributions that can be encoded by a few ‘sufﬁcient sta-
tistics’, for example, the mean and its precision (or inverse
variance). While precision determines the inﬂuence one piece of
information has over another in Bayesian inference, synaptic
gain determines the inﬂuence one neural population has over
another in neural message passing. The neurobiological sub-
strate of precision could therefore be synaptic gain,22 and a loss
of synaptic gain in a given area could reduce the precision of
information encoded there.
A loss of synaptic gain in PFC or HC would diminish their
inﬂuence over lower level areas. In the model, this would cor-
respond to a loss of inﬂuence (ie, precision) of the model’s
more abstract priors over the more concrete sensory data. To
the extent to which the higher levels extract and represent more
stable, general features of the world, their loss might make the
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world look less predictable and more surprising. This simple
computational change can describe a great variety of phenom-
ena in schizophrenia (ﬁgure 2; more references and simulations
of some of these phenomena are elsewhere68):
▸ At a neurophysiological level, responses to predictable
stimuli resemble responses to unpredicted stimuli, and vice
versa, in both perceptual electrophysiology experiments (eg,
the P50 or P300 responses to tones71) and cognitive func-
tional MRI paradigms;
▸ At a network level, higher regions of the cortex (ie, PFC and
HC) have diminished connectivity to the thalamus relative to
controls, whereas primary sensory areas are coupled more
strongly with this region;72
▸ At a perceptual level, a greater resistance to visual illusions73
(which exploit the effects of visual priors on ambiguous
images, eg, the famous ‘hollow-mask’ illusion74) and a failure
to attenuate the sensory consequences of one’s own actions,
which could diminish one’s sense of agency;75
▸ At a behavioural level, impaired smooth visual pursuit of a
predictably moving target, but better tracking of a sudden
unpredictable change in a target’s motion.76
An alternative interpretation of these changes is that path-
ology in the PFC or HC (eg, in postsynaptic signalling and
neurotrophic pathways77) might impair the formation and rep-
resentation of prior beliefs more generally, rather than directly
and selectively affecting only a separate representation of their
certainty. Indeed, if this were the case, then reducing the inﬂu-
ence of aberrant beliefs on sensory processing might even be
computationally adaptive (and physiological rather than patho-
physiological), since it would reduce their (possibly misleading)
inﬂuence on inference.
How do the above ideas relate to the actual symptoms of
psychosis? A reasonable hypothesis would be that a loss of high-
level precision in the brain’s hierarchical inference might result
in diffuse, generalised cognitive problems (as are routinely
found in schizophrenia78) and overattention to sensory stimuli
(as is found in the ‘delusional mood’; similar in some respects
to the loss of central coherence in autism—see below). In add-
ition, it could lead to the formation of more speciﬁc unusual
beliefs, as the reduced high-level precision permits updates to
beliefs that are larger and less constrained. This is because the
precision of (low-level) prediction errors is much higher, relative
to the (high-level) prior beliefs (an imbalance reﬂected in con-
nectivity analyses72). However, one might expect that these
unusual beliefs should be ﬂeeting—as they themselves would be
vulnerable to rapid updating—unlike delusions.
This account raises two important (and, we propose, related)
questions that we address in the next section. First, if high-level
precision is generally low, why do delusions, which appear to
exist at a reasonably high (conceptual) level in the hierarchy,
become so ﬁxed? Second, what is the computational impact of
the best-established neurobiological abnormality in schizophre-
nia—an elevation in presynaptic dopamine?79
Striatal presynaptic dopamine elevation
The positive symptoms of schizophrenia are strongly associated
with the elevated presynaptic availability of dopamine in the
dorsal (associative) striatum,79 and are reduced by D2 receptor
(but not D1 receptor) antagonists (although neither is always the
case80). Increased stimulation of striatal D2 receptors might then
be a sufﬁcient cause of psychosis, but the exact nature of this
stimulation and how it causes psychotic symptoms remains
unclear.
In electrophysiological studies, dopamine neurons show both
tonic and phasic ﬁring patterns;81 D1 receptors are most sensi-
tive to phasic bursts, whereas tonic activity and phasic pauses
are best detected by D2 receptors.
82 These patterns cannot be
distinguished using brain imaging in humans, unless their com-
putational roles can be modelled and thus their quantities
inferred from behaviour. It is as yet unclear how the increased
presynaptic availability of dopamine alters these patterns in
schizophrenia: One might expect that both tonic and phasic
release would increase in proportion, but an increase in tonic
release could reduce phasic release, for example, via inhibitory
presynaptic receptors,83 and these two modes of release have
also been argued to be at least partially independent.81 We now
explore how these patterns may be disrupted in schizophrenia,
and how this might affect computations.
Tonic dopamine signalling
Tonic striatal D2 hyperstimulation is thought to increase inhib-
ition of the corticostriatothalamocortical loops in the so-called
indirect pathway through the striatum. The indirect pathway
itself contains two inhibitory pathways. One (via the subthala-
mic nucleus) causes blanket inhibition of action and acts as a
brake, but the other is channelised84 such that it can help
switching to alternative actions.
If the indirect pathway enables switching, then increased
tonic D2 receptor activity in the striatum ought to oppose this
(interestingly, D2 receptors also suppress alternative task ‘rules’
in PFC85). Indeed, reversal learning performance decreases with
increasing occupancy of D2 receptors in the dorsal
86 87 and
ventral81 striatum, and with genetic variants in the dopamine
transporter that might increase tonic dopamine.88 Sufferers of
schizophrenia are impaired at reversal learning over and above
their generalised cognitive impairment,89 90 which is in keeping
with these ﬁndings. D2-mediated inﬂexibility might even make
delusions so resistant to change.
From a computational point of view, this striatal D2 hypersti-
mulation could reduce an agent’s perception of volatility in the
world (x3 in ﬁgure 1), causing action tendencies (known as pol-
icies) to become more ﬁxed and have (incorrectly) high ‘preci-
sion’. Indeed, work in addiction has similarly argued that
dopamine promotes rather less ﬂexible habits over goal-directed
choices.91 This is interesting because it is conceivable that a
hyperdopaminergic increase in (dorsal striatal) precision of pol-
icies might occur as an adaptation to a loss of (prefrontal) high-
level precision (ω2 in ﬁgure 1),
68 that is, that the excessive
dorsal striatal dopamine release found in prefrontal dysfunc-
tion92 93 is an attempt to stabilise thoughts and action selection
in the face of cognitive instability.
Even if this is so, one must still ask why so many other risk
factors for schizophrenia—for example, social isolation or sub-
ordination, prenatal or perinatal adversity, and acute stress—
cause dopamine hyperactivity?79 One could argue that the com-
putational commonality among these factors is an increase in
predicted environmental volatility, but raised tonic dopamine
release makes decisions less, not more, volatile.
Phasic dopamine signalling
The phasic responses of dopamine neurons comprise bursts and
pauses, which facilitate the excitatory ‘direct’ pathway through
excitatory D1 receptors, and facilitate the inhibitory ‘indirect’
pathway through inhibitory D2 receptors, respectively. These
have been proposed to reﬂect reward prediction errors94 (but
also aversive prediction errors95 and the precision or ‘salience’
of prediction errors96) in the ventral and dorsal striatum.
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Actor-critic models6 propose that reward prediction errors act
as signals which teach the ventral striatum (critic) the values of
states, and the dorsal striatum (actor) to associate states with
optimal actions (by increasing the excitation or reducing the
inhibition of the currently selected action6), with recent evi-
dence for a causal role of dopamine in this regard.97
In fMRI paradigms designed to elicit reward prediction error
and reward prediction signals, patients with schizophrenia show
diminished appropriate activations98 but greater inappropriate
activations in the ventral striatum,99 compared with controls.
Similar patterns were observed in an associative learning task
without explicit rewards;100 however, fMRI cannot tell whether
these abnormalities are due to abnormal phasic dopamine sig-
nalling. Although behavioural responses in such tasks are often
less abnormal than the underlying neural activity,101 computa-
tional modelling of behaviour in the beads task102 and reward
learning tasks27 suggests that the impact of phasic positive feed-
back is diminished in schizophrenia. This may indicate that an
elevated tonic dopamine level is reducing phasic bursts (reward
learning) but not phasic pauses (punishment learning), and
indeed PET studies suggest an inverse relationship between tonic
DA and phasic BOLD signals.103 An alternative suggestion is
that this apparent reward learning deﬁcit may actually be caused
by reduced working memory capacity.104
Figure 2 Effects of a hierarchical precision imbalance in schizophrenia. A loss of precision encoding in higher hierarchical areas would bias inference
away from prior beliefs and towards sensory evidence (the likelihood), illustrated schematically in the middle panel. This single change could manifest
in many ways (moving anticlockwise from left to right). (i) A loss of the ability to smoothly pursue a target moving predictably (in this plot, the patient
with schizophrenia constantly falls behind the target in his eye tracking, and has to saccade to catch up again); when the target is brieﬂy stabilised on
his retina (to reveal the purely predictive element of pursuit), shown as the red unbroken line, his/her eye velocity drops very signiﬁcantly (ﬁgure
adapted from Hong et al76). (ii) These graphs illustrate averaged electrophysiological responses in a mismatch negativity paradigm, in which a series of
identical tones is followed by a deviant (oddball) tone; in the control subject, the oddball causes a pronounced negative deﬂection at around 120 ms
(blue circle), but in a patient with schizophrenia, there is no such deﬂection (red circle); that is, the brain responses to predictable and unpredictable
stimuli are very similar (ﬁgure adapted from Turetsky et al71). (iii) The physiological change underlying the precision imbalance is a relative decrease in
synaptic gain in high hierarchical areas, and a relative increase in lower hierarchical areas. This change would also manifest as an alteration in
connectivity, shown here as signiﬁcant whole brain differences in connectivity with a thalamic seed between controls and patients with schizophrenia;
red/yellow areas are more strongly coupled in those with schizophrenia, and include primary sensory areas (auditory, visual, motor and somatosensory);
blue areas are more weakly coupled, and include higher hierarchical areas (medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex and hippocampus) and
the striatum (ﬁgure adapted from Anticevic et al72). (iv) An imbalance in hierarchical precision may lead to a failure to attenuate the sensory
consequences of one’s own actions,75 here illustrated by the force-matching paradigm used to measure this effect. In this paradigm, the participant
must match a target force by either pressing on a bar with their ﬁnger (below) or using a mechanical transducer (top): Control subjects tend to exert
more force than necessary in the former condition, but patient with schizophrenia do not (ﬁgure adapted from Pareés et al119). (v) A loss of the
precision of prior beliefs can cause a resistance to visual illusions that rely on those prior beliefs for their perceptual effects. Control subjects perceive
the face on the right as a convex face lit from below, due to a powerful prior belief that faces are convex, whereas patients with schizophrenia tend to
perceive it veridically as a concave (hollow) face lit from above.
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Incentive (and aberrant) salience
The theory of incentive salience proposes that ventral striatal
dopamine signalling (whether phasic or tonic) gives motiv-
ational impetus to act on stimuli whose values have already been
learnt.105 Incentive salience is closely related to MF learning of
values,91 106 and might also be related to the precision or conﬁ-
dence of beliefs that actions will have preferred outcomes.96 In
the ‘aberrant salience’ hypothesis, Kapur107 proposed that there
is aberrant (ie, increased inappropriate) signalling of incentive
salience in patients with positive psychotic symptoms.
Unmedicated prodromal psychotic patients do experience—in
proportion to their positive symptoms—irrelevant features of
stimuli in a reward learning task as ‘aberrantly salient’ (although
this is not obviously reﬂected in their reaction times), but their
striatal activations are harder to interpret.108
A weakness of the aberrant salience hypothesis is that the con-
nection between aberrant motivational signalling and the abnor-
mal inference (hallucinations) and abnormal learning (delusions)
found in positive symptoms is not intuitive (assuming that delu-
sions do indeed involve abnormal learning). One could also
argue that aberrant motivational salience works best as an
account of manic psychosis—in which the patient is energised
and perceives events in a positive light—rather than schizo-
phrenic psychosis, which is often aversive in nature. Conversely,
diminished appropriate salience signalling (not part of the ori-
ginal hypothesis but identiﬁed in several studies) provides a
plausible explanation for negative symptoms; and, indeed, a loss
of ventral striatal activation to rewards has been shown to be
proportional to negative symptoms in unmedicated patients
with schizophrenia.109
Aside from aberrant salience, there are many other potential
explanations for negative symptoms;15 for example, pronounced
asymmetry in learning (ie, a failure to learn stimulus-reward
associations but intact learning of stimulus-punishment associa-
tions), a failure to infer the values of actions (cf. anhedonia in
depression), greater discounting of rewards that require
effort,110 and a loss of uncertainty-driven exploration such that
valuable states are never discovered.
CONCLUSION
In this brief overview, we have attempted to highlight some
aspects of the Computational Psychiatry approach to characteris-
ing and measuring the brain’s inferences. We have not had space
to review Computational Psychiatry approaches to many mental
disorders, such as anxiety,111 personality disorder,8 autism,112
attention deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder,113 addiction,6 functional
symptoms114 and others. We focused instead on two examples:
The ﬁrst was that of depression, where we suggested that MB
valuation may be the at the root of anhedonia.27 Our second
example was the concept of reduced high-level precision in
schizophrenia. We must emphasise, however, that their descrip-
tion in the context of speciﬁc disorders should not necessarily
be taken to imply speciﬁcity to these disorders. The dysfunc-
tions in meta-reasoning described here in depression could
probably be applied equally well to certain anxiety disorders.115
Anhedonia is also found in schizophrenia, and in this context
just as in depression, hedonic responses to primary rewards
seem normal,116 yet pleasure-seeking behaviour is reduced. If
so, Computational Psychiatry might help identify transdiagnostic
computational mechanisms: we must then investigate the extent
to which such mechanisms share biological substrates.
Similarly, alterations in the use or representation of uncertainty
may underlie phenomena not just in schizophrenia, but also in
autism (eg, a resistance to visual illusions, and sensory overatten-
tion112). However, an important difference between the disor-
ders may be that this reduction in precision arises earlier in
development in autism. Thus, while sufferers of both disorders
may have uncertainty about the mental states of others, those
with autism have never learnt to attribute mental states to others.
In contrast, those with schizophrenia have done so in the past,
but in the present they ﬁnd themselves in a state of high anxiety
and uncertain of others’ intentions, possibly suggesting why para-
noid persecutory ideas might be commonly found in schizophre-
nia, but not autism. In this case, then, common computational
mechanisms may undergo distinct interactions with the environ-
ment. In both cases, the hope is that Computational Psychiatry
will identify patterns that map more closely onto the underlying
neurobiology than current diagnoses do.
Aside from disorders that are thought of as purely psychiatric,
Computational Psychiatry has been used to examine putatively
dopaminergic computations in neurological conditions such as
Parkinson’s disease and Tourette’s syndrome. In some classic
studies, Frank and colleagues devised a probabilistic task which
quantiﬁes individuals’ abilities to learn from positive and nega-
tive feedback, encoded by dopamine bursts and pauses, respect-
ively. They showed that dopamine-depleted patients with
Parkinson’s disease were better than controls at learning from
negative feedback, but dopaminergic medication reverses this
bias.6
This asymmetry could underlie the phenomenon of patho-
logical gambling in the context of dopamine agonist treatment:
such patients may be able to learn only from their wins but not
their losses. Interestingly, the opposite asymmetry (better learning
from positive feedback, reversed by antidopaminergic medication)
was seen in the hyperdopaminergic Tourette’s syndrome.117
Computational Psychiatry approaches are also being used to inves-
tigate motivation and effort cost in apathy118—found in
Parkinson’s disease and numerous other neurological conditions—
and it will be interesting to see how many underlying computa-
tional mechanisms are shared with negative symptoms in
schizophrenia.
Computational Psychiatry is no panacea, however, and several
important pitfalls ought to be mentioned. The ﬁrst is the inter-
pretation of the results of Bayesian model selection: the ‘best’
model is extremely unlikely to model the true generative process
correctly, and may be but the best of a set of bad models. Model
comparison must always be accompanied by model validation,
which involves generating surrogate data from the model and
comparing it qualitatively with the data of interest.
Generating data will in fact often identify systematic failures
of models that may confound the interpretation of their para-
meters. This will require the addition of ad hoc parameters to
explain speciﬁc aspects of the data that may interfere with infer-
ence, but not be of interest. Consider a data set where a patient
has an idiosyncratic preference for responding to the left or to
the right. If such a preference is not allowed for in the model,
then the parameters of the model will be forced to explain such
a preference. This may lead to spurious conclusions, just as the
failure to recognise such irrelevant idiosyncrasies may confound
classical analyses.
Furthermore, modelling does not replace careful experimental
design. If a task does not exploit a particular computation, then
that computation cannot be examined simply by ﬁtting a model
requiring that computation to the data. Put differently, the com-
plexity of the model must be supported by complex data, and
this in turn requires appropriate experimental design. The last
pitfall we shall mention concerns a ubiquitous parameter in
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decision-making models: the ‘temperature’ parameter of the
softmax action selection function. This controls the stochasticity
of decision-making, such that the greater it is, the less decisions
reﬂect the values of different options, that is, the more random
they are. It is always possible, however, that a difference in the
stochasticity of responses between groups reﬂects a non-random
process that has not been included in the model. Hence, it is
important to examine whether the noise assumed by the model
actually matches that observed in the data.
Our fundamental message is that thinking of the brain as
having to solve inferential problems can be a fruitful way of gen-
erating testable computational hypotheses about psychiatric dis-
orders. The Bayesian perspective formalises the key aspects of
inference and underlines the importance of uncertainty, while
the RL view formalises the key aspects of choice. Characterising
psychiatric disorders as problems of inference or learning—
whether in the domain of rewards, threats, somatic percepts,
‘external’ percepts or social inferences—makes them tractable to
analysis with these techniques.
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